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The introduction of pathogenic agents and invasive species into a country are 
closely related to international ship movements, and these hazards grow 
proportionally with the increase of global trade.  
These biological hazards travel onboard ships and can cause irreparable 
damage to humans, animals, plants, and the environment and biodiversity. 
 The comb jellyfish case in the Caspian and the Black Sea, the black death 
case in in the sixth, seventh and fourteenth centuries, or the Cholera bacteria case in 
South America (1991), are clear examples of the mobility, reach, and consequences 
the arrival of biohazards can cause. 
The intention of this research is to explore the different approaches related to 
biosecurity, in order to identify its main characteristics, requirements, and the 
measures necessary to prevent, control, mitigate, and protect the country from 
adverse biohazard impacts. 
Subsequently, an evaluation of the current Peruvian biosecurity regime will be 
carried out, in order to identify the main gaps if any, competent authorities, actual 
legislation, and procedures.  
Finally, the author of this investigation will demonstrate the importance to of 
integrating Biosecurity Policies in the Maritime Sector, to improve national 
legislations, and to use the organizations, infrastructures, and the systems that are 
already in place. 
To achieve this, an exploratory design through qualitative research will be 
used. The information will be collected through reliable bibliographic sources, 
international and national legislation, as well as case studies related to biosecurity. A 
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Chapter 1 Introduction. 
Currently, a significant portion of the Peruvian population has migrated along the 
coastal lines of the Pacific Ocean. These displacements from inland, in addition to the growth 
of the population, demand more care of the sea and responsible use of it, since it is a source 
of food, commerce, recreation and energy for all Peruvians. 
The oceans are the main means of transport of national and international trade; 
approximately 90% of Peru's external trade is carried out by the sea (APN, 2016). The diverse 
hydro-biological resources make Peru one of the richest in this area, added to its 
geographically favorable location in the center of South America in the Pacific Ocean basin, 
where the fastest-growing economies are. 
Chapter 1.1: Motivation of the investigation 
A significant number of Peruvians human and commercial activities are carried out in 
the coastal zone, from commercial activities to sports and tourism activities (INEI, 2019). The 
absence of integrated policies related to biological security or biosecurity in the maritime field 
can affect the effectiveness of current measures to protect Peru from the unwanted arrival of 
pathogens a non-native species which, both, can affect the ecosystem, population, and the 
national economy.  
Biosecurity, as discussed in this work, represents an integrated approach to face 
biological threats through effective resource management requiring cross-sector collaboration, 
harmonization of national regulatory frameworks and objectives. The aim is to prevent the 
arrival of an unwanted and unintentional introduction of any biological hazard. 
In addition to carrying cargo, ships also transport people, animals, microorganisms, 
plants, and everything attached to the transport operations. The main pathways to biological 
hazards or biohazards (see figure 1) by ships are: 





Biological risks related to the shipping industry  
The increase in international man-made transport has boosted biodiversity exchanges 
and risks to public health with a global reach (WHO, 2005). It is essential to see the shipping 
industry not only as an open window for progress but also as a pathway to several biological 
hazards that could affect the security and economy of countries.  
To avoid biohazards affecting national interests, they must be controlled by appropriate 
national measures developed by various entities (FAO, 2007). To achieve it efficiently, cross-
sectoral cooperation is required. The government needs to define who has the competences, 
responsibilities, jurisdiction, and functions. The preventive and protective measures must be 
guided by an appropriate harmonized, integrated, and long-term policy that generates 
synergies in the actions of the different sectors of the state.  
Peru under a latent biohazards exposure 
New investments and technological developments increase the use of marine coastal 
areas. Peru has 85 port facilities, which are scattered along its 3000 km of the coastal profile 
(APN, n/d). The main economic activities of the country are mining, fishing and agriculture and 
the export of these products are done through these port facilities, which makes Peru a great 
exporter of raw materials and intermediate products (INEI, 2019).  
Peruvian importations are technological products, intermediate products, and also 
direct human consumption products (INEI, 2019). In this regard, maritime trade is vital to 
Peru's  income. Therefore, the high number of port facilities and the constant increasing of 
international travels to the Peruvian coast (see figure 2) the risk of biohazards intrusion in any 
of these entry points increase. The central government has the responsibility to address this 
risk adequately. 
Figure 2, International ships received in Peruvian ports. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe 
Addressing biological hazards  
By assessing the upcoming risks accurately, it could be possible to prevent the 
recurrence of biological incidents such as invasive species or biological pathogens (e.g., 
Cholera bacteria) (FAO / WHO, 2002). In order to develop a suitable risk assessment, it is 
necessary to develop a biosecurity framework inside, where roles and responsibilities are well 
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defined; technical and scientific capabilities are identified; infrastructure, communication 
system, and data exchange/storage are well-established. 
In this sense, the purpose of this work is: 
 To identify and describe the current components of the biosecurity regime in 
Peru. 
 To assess the current regulations; and 
 To identify and discuss the gaps. 
This work will begin by defining the main concepts related to Biosecurity handled at 
the international level, continuing with a revision of the current international regulations and 
how they are being applied in some countries.  
Next, the biosecurity approach will be compared and discussed with the Peruvian 
Maritime Regulations. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be provided. 
Chapter 1.2 Problem statement. 
 The timely identification of the biological risks derived from maritime activities is the 
only way to be prepared and prevented (FAO, 2007). 
Because globalization and modern transport systems intensify exchanges of goods and 
people, there is a need to strengthen national protections against biological risks of all forms. 
To enhance the effectiveness of preventive measures and responses, FAO, some 
governmental bodies and researchers, propose to develop integrated biosecurity policy.  
 This approach is an answer to current disconnection among various administrations. 
Indeed, each sector of the State performs its functions independently without paying sufficient 
attention to the causes that could affect biosecurity. Most states continue facing biosecurity 
risks with sectoral orientation, which results in inadequate and inefficient management of 
resources and unsatisfactory results (FAO, 2007). This also means that each authority carries 
out its own risk assessment but from the perspective of its functions and responsibilities. It 
generates overlapping of functions, wastage of resources, redundancy of procedures, or 
discarding of risks associated with other authorities. 
In summary, the introduction of pathogens affecting human health, animals or plants 
as well as invasive species are transported either: intentionally (rainbow trout case – see 
appendix 1) or unintentionally (Cholera bacteria case – see chapter 4). In both cases, it 
involves man-made transportation. In order to develop a proper biosecurity risk assessment, 
adequate national policies must be set.  
Chapter 1.3 Objectives of the investigation. 
The aim of this work is to assess the Peruvian biosecurity regime, including the legal 
framework, institutional framework, communication and information exchange system, 
competent authorities, technical and scientific capabilities, and risk assessment in the 
maritime field. To accomplish the main objective, it is necessary to achieve the following 
secondary objectives: 
 To identify the main concepts related to biosecurity. 
 To identify the biosecurity approaches that are actually in place around the world. 
 To identify the Peruvian biosecurity regime and analyze it. 




 To assess the need for cross-sectoral cooperation. 
 To elucidate which biosecurity approach is the most suitable in accordance 
with the Peruvian maritime legislation. 
Chapter 1.4 Research questions. 
 How is the biosecurity regime organized in Peru? 
o Why is it important to assess it and/or improve it if necessary? 
o Which components are necessaries to develop a national biosecurity 
strategy? 
Chapter 1.5 Methodology of the investigation. 
  This research will use an exploratory design through qualitative research. The 
information will be collected through bibliographic evaluation, international and national 
legislation, as well as case studies related to biosecurity. What is sought is to know, define 
and outline in detail the current approaches related to biosecurity policies, analyze their impact 
on the maritime sector, the advantages and disadvantages that their implementation may 
represent, and determine their applicability in Peruvian maritime legislation. 
 The analysis will be carried out using a SWOT matrix in order to determine the 
challenges and possibilities that each biosecurity policy approach provides. In this way, it will 
be possible to determine the most suitable approach to be applied in Peruvian maritime 
legislation. 
Chapter 1.6 Potential limitations. 
 The limited availability of Peruvian authorities affected the data collection. Some 
agencies have not been able to share relevant information related to their internal functioning, 
procedures, and protocols. Therefore, the current work could be limited due to gaps in data 
availability and time allocated to do the work. 
Chapter 1.7 Delimitation of the investigation. 
 Maritime-focus, the present work discusses the protective systems in place to control 
unintentional biological hazards coming from a ship. So, biological weapons or species 
purposely-introduced are not included.  
During the development of this work, references to other means of transport or activities may 
be used, like fishing vessels or trains, in order to demonstrate how biological hazards, move 









Chapter 2 Background. 
Since ancient times biological hazards have been closely related to trading. Transport 
of biological pathogen or invasive species has been identified as a by-product of seaborne 
transport. For example, several plague outbreaks moved all along Europe, Africa, and Asia, 
following the routes of commerce (VI, VII, XIV & XIX centuries).  
The initial solution to avoid the spread of the disease was to restrict the entry of goods 
and people coming from infected places, in other words by using preventive measures 
(Gensini, Yacoub & Conti, 2004). 
FAO provides in its toolkit on biosecurity a broad definition of biological hazard:  
 biological pathogen representing a potential risk to health and life of humans, 
animals, and plants; and,  
 an invasive species which represent a risk to the biodiversity or the environment 
(FAO, 2007).  
 FAO identifies the main biological hazards that affect the different biosecurity sectors 
(health, environment, maritime, agriculture, livestock & economic), see table N° 1. 
Table 1, self‐elaboration “Biological hazards.” Source: “Biosecurity The Socio‐Politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases.” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013) 
These biological hazards have entry points and possible exit points. Without control, 
there are no limits on the distance the t biological hazards can spread. The borders between 
countries represent administrative entry-exit points where control measures have developed 
for people and goods (WHO, 2016; WHO, 2005).  
Any form of measure (preventive or responsive) to control biological hazards could be 
called biological security or biosecurity. In this respect, the development of quarantine 
represents the first attempt to control biological risks from ships (Mayer, 2018).  
Chapter 2.1 From quarantine to biosecurity policy. 
Since remote times, "quarantine" has been the first measure initiated by authorities 
(local or national) to protect public health and trade in ports. 
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Following the black death, in 1377, the term “quarantine” was used for the first time in 
the port of Ragusa in southern Italy, when the port authorities decreed a period of 30 days of 
isolation for ships arriving at port and 40 days for travelers by land (Gensini, Yacoub & Conti, 
2004). 
The term quarantine is derived from the Italian word “quarantina” or “Quaranta giorni,” 
and was used in the XIV and XV century to indicate that the vessel under that regime was in 
a 40-day isolation period prior to authorizing them to enter into ports (Institute for Bioethics, 
2003). At that time, doctors believed that if the people or the ship's cargo came from a 
contaminated city, during those forty days, a sick person could die or recover. It was also used 
to try and assess the minimum time the “healthy people” on board took to get sick. Later, 
during the XV century, this practice was extended to all Europe and its colonies (Gensini, 
Yacoub & Conti, 2004). 
However, it was not until the 11th Sanitary Conference developed in Paris in 1903, the 
first useful international convention, in which an integrating concept for the control of epidemic 
diseases was introduced (quarantine measures). This convention also had historical 
importance because it established the first International Health Organization, which became 
known as the International Office of Public Hygiene (IOPH), later the World Health 
Organization, in 1948 (Schepin & Yermanov, 1991). 
Quarantine and isolation 
Isolation refers to the separation and confinement of subjects already known to be 
infected by a contagious disease in order to prevent the spread of this disease. 
Quarantine refers to the separation of people who have been exposed to any disease, 
but it is not possible to see any symptom yet (Barbera et al., 2001). 
The emergence of biological control systems: biosafety  
In 1865, Baron Joseph Lister instituted the practice of antiseptic techniques when 
working in the surgery room in order to avoid contamination of medical personnel (Madigan, 
Martinko & Parker, 1999). However, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that preventive 
standards were established in the United States in medical workplaces, facilities, and 
laboratories (US Department, 2009). Today renamed biosafety, include the measures 
containment principles, technologies, and practices that are implemented to prevent 
unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release (Burnette, 2013). 
The emergence of biosecurity practices. 
The international community adopted the term biosecurity to refer to any procedure or 
protocol that aims to control the consequences that arise from all types of biological agents 
which endanger the health of people, animals, plants and the environment (Burnette, 2013). 
Since then, the concept of biosecurity has taken on a broader approach which will be 
discussed in the following chapters. 
Biosecurity related specialized agencies 
There are several specialized agencies of the United Nations that have taken actions 
about Biosecurity, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations 
Organization for Food and Agriculture (FAO), World Trade Organization. (WTO), the World 
Bank Organization (WBO), the Codex Alimentary Commission (CAC), the Commission on 
Phytosanitary Measures (CPM), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), International 
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Maritime Organization (IMO), and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (FAO, 
2007). 
Chapter 2.2 Recent examples of biological hazards 
The inadequate perception of the biological risks hinders the development of adequate 
policies by the responsible authorities. The need for proper distribution of resources, the 
establishment of appropriate practices and procedures, and proper training for personnel are 
derived from these policies.  
The risk assessment is the tool for timely identification of the potential arrival of 
biohazards in order to diminish their effects (FAO, 2007). There are two cases that exhibit how 
biological hazards arrived.  
Comb jellyfish invasion to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.  
The scientific name of this invasive species is Mnemiopsis leidyi. It is a native species 
of the western Atlantic (Mianzan 1999). In the last 30 years, this species has expanded to 
almost all the seas of Europe; the Azov Sea, the Marmara Sea, the Caspian Sea, the North 
Sea, the Baltic Sea and the eastern and western Mediterranean Sea. However, in the early 
1980s, this Jellyfish was accidentally introduced into the Black Sea through the ballast water 
of ships (Vinogradov et al. 1989). 
In most of the invaded areas, it has been described as an invasive species with a high 
impact on the marine ecosystem, with dramatic effects on the zoo-planktonic and ichthio-
planktonic communities; therefore, with significant ecological, social, economic and 
environmental consequences. (Dumont, Shiganova & Nierman, 2005). The introduction of 
comb jelly in the Black Sea is considered one of the most dramatic bio-invasions of recent 
times. In initial absence of predators, chronic overfishing, environmental and eutrophication, 
the Mnemiopsis established and invaded its new environment (Shiganova et al., 2001). 
From the Black Sea, the comb jellyfish invade the Caspian Sea. Most likely the invasive 
species transited via ballast water of ships through the Volga-Don Canal (Bilio & Niermann, 
2004). In that sea, its propagation was very fast, reaching its full extent towards the year 2000, 
and simultaneously observing essential effects on the zooplankton biomass, both in its density 
and diversity of species (Shiganova et al., 2001). In addition, similar to what happened in the 
Black Sea, the catch of fish decreased significantly (Kideys 2002). 
In the Black Sea case, the invasion was controlled almost naturally by another 
spontaneous introduction (ballast water) of a new predator called “Beroe cf ovata,” which is 
another type of jellyfish (Dumont, Shiganova & Nierman, 2005). 
In this case, the unintentional release of this invasive species had high economical 
loses affecting fisheries and population. However, biodiversity was the most affected sector, 
because the comb jellyfish in the Caspian Sea almost made all zooplankton extinct and the 
latter is the source of the food web. 
The absence of adequate biosecurity policies allowed the invasive species to move 
from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black and Caspian Sea. Due to the high traffic into the Caspian 
Sea IMO recommended to the Caspian Environment Project that they develop a new 






Ebola outbreak during 2014-2016 in West Africa.  
This outbreak was the most extensive since the virus was discovered in 1976. About 
28,712 people were infected with this disease (WHO, 2019). Despite that this outbreak was 
efficiently contained, it revealed how easily a biological pathogen can move across borders. 
The first case occurred in March 2014 in Guinea. Regional movements established the 
disease in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Then travelers from the infected region were found in 
Nigeria, Senegal and United States. A contaminated healthcare professional returned from 
her volunteer service in Sierra Leone and brought the disease to Spain. The virus spread to 
almost all of the continents, reaching the United Kingdom in December 2014 (MSCBS, 2016), 
see figure N°3.  
Figure 3, “Ebola outbreak distribution.” Source: http://www.imo.org 
On October 22, 2014, the 3rd meeting of the International Health Regulations (IHR) 
Emergency Committee declared the Ebola outbreak as a global public health emergency, 
under the scope of IHR article 12 (WHO, 2014).  
However, the committee recommended that there should be no prohibition on trade or 
international travels. The IMO reinforced this recommendation, indicating to all stakeholders 
and states parties that they should follow the recommendations issued by the WHO in order 
not to worsen the economic and labor situation of the affected countries (IMO, 2014a).  
IMO published the circular letter No. 3485 on September 10, 2014, for all member 
states, entitled "Full and effective implementation of maritime protection measures to help 
prevent the spread of the disease from the Ebola virus." This circular dictates the special 
measures to increase maritime protection contained in chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention 
and in the ISPS Code (IMO, 2014b).  
On the same day, WHO and IMO jointly sent a letter to all member states, specifically 
to the ministries responsible for ports and the merchant industry, port authorities, and 
merchant companies. This letter emphasizes the need to continue promoting free trade and 
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international travel with affected countries and that all measures taken are only related to the 
protection of the health of human beings, under the scope of the article 15 of the IHR 
“temporary recommendations” (WHO/IMO, 2014).  
In addition, IMO developed an infographic named “What you need to know” in order to 
provide information concerning measures that should be taken to prevent contacting the Ebola 












Figure 4, “What you need to know.” Source: http://www.imo.orgFigure N° 4, “What you need to know.” Source: http://www.imo.org 
The Ebola outbreak case elucidates the speed and mobility of the biological pathogen 
across borders. Despite that the virus reaches other continents, the containment of the virus 
was effective. Coordinated work contained the spread to rest of the world. 
An appropriated risk assessment, under the scope of a strong, harmonize and 
integrated biosecurity policy, could help to prevent (before the hazards arrive), control (when 
the hazards arrive) and mitigate (after the hazards arrive) unwanted incidents.  
Chapter 2.3 Literature review and clarification of Biosecurity concepts   
Publications used in the development of this research were found in the library of the 
World Maritime University, the central library of Copenhagen - Denmark and by using 
academic search engines. 
Although none of the publications used (books and academic articles), explicitly 
discuss biosecurity in the maritime field. They do however, they mention means of transport 
in general and physical and economic borders, which the author of this research has used as 
a link with the topic developed and the international instruments involved with the topic. 
Likewise, these publications have served as a conceptual guide and backbone during the 







Biohazards, Biorisk and Biothreat 
According to Ryan Burnette (2013), biohazards is the sum of biorisks and biothreats (see 
figure 5). The differences between the last two are that a biorisk can be assessed because it 
is something that has already been identified as harmful to humans, animals, and plants health 
or the environment. While a biothreat is something still unknown that could be harmful too, but 
the consequences are still unknown; therefore, it cannot be assessed. 
Figure 5, “Biohazards, biorisks & biothreats.” Source: “Biosecurity: assessing, and Preventing the threat” (Burnette, 2013). 
Biological security or biosecurity 
 The term biosecurity is relatively new. It arose after the attack of the twin towers in 
2001 in the United States, thus reaching the agendas of international organizations 
(Donaldson, 2008; FAO, 2008; Falk et al., 2011). 
 The authors of the book “Biosecurity: The Socio-Politics of Invasive Species and 
Infectious Diseases” coincide with FAO, by defining biosecurity as a “strategic and integrated 
approach that encompasses the regulatory frameworks (including instruments and activities) 
for analysis and management of risks related to the life and health of people, animals and 
plants and the associated risks to the environment” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013; FAO, 
2007). 
Importance of Biosecurity in the present world 
 Reduction of trade barriers, globalization and effective transport at low cost, facilitate 
cargo and people mobility which increases the biohazards reach and density. (FAO, 2007).  
In consequence, biosecurity is essential because the world needs it to build strong 
capacities, develop adequate measures and encourage the collaboration between the 
stakeholders in order to protect public health and the environment (Bakanidze, Imnadze & 
Perkins, 2010).  
Areas where biosecurity could be applied 
 For the purpose of this maritime-focused research, the author considers that 
biosecurity could be applied in three main sectors:  
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 The environmental sector, in order to protect the biodiversity and human, animal 
and plant health because of the controlled and uncontrolled transport of biodiversity 
and use of biotechnology (UN, 1992; SCBD, 2000). A report shows than 10% of all 
preventable diseases are due to degradation of the environment (FAO, 2007).  
 The health sector, in order to implement consistent policies, operating procedures 
and technical capacities as required by IHR (Bakanidze, Imnadze & Perkins, 2010). 
By implementing these requirements, every State can heed these warnings and 
conduct efficient prevention, control or mitigation of any biological incident.  
 The maritime sector, in order establish measures, protocols, and procedures 
enabling effective protection of public health, the environment, and the economy 
and ensuring compliance with international regulations, without undermining free 
trade, ensuring the safety and security of shipping and port activities (IMO, 2013). 
Operationalizing biosecurity concepts 
 By developing a National biosecurity strategy with the proper policy framework, legal 
framework, institutional framework, communication and information exchange system, risk 
analysis and designating the competent authorities, provide technical and scientific capability 
and infrastructures (FAO, 2007). To improve the national biosecurity capability, it is necessary 
to enhance cross-sectoral convergence towards biosecurity objectives (FAO, 2007). 
Limitations related to biosecurity 
 The main limitations to the implementation of biosecurity framework are the absence 
of political will, often related to a conflict of interest or prioritization of other state problems. 
Another limitation is the sectorial approach and silo thinking (FAO, 2007). Each sector of the 
state develops its own regulations, objectives, and procedures without taking into 
consideration those developed by related sectors. 
  The question is, what can we do as a State to face biohazards? Examples of states 
that have developed and implemented biosecurity policies in their domestic regulations can 
be applied (New Zealand, Finland, Australia).  
Globalization and biosecurity stakeholders. 
 The shipping industry is the ideal representation of the globalization of the economies. 
Therefore, the most interested parties in this sector are all those who have some relationship 
with economic development (private, public or civil society) (Meyerson & Reaser, 2002). The 
public players could be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, finance, production, agriculture, 
livestock, fisheries, transport, and tourism, among others. 
On the other hand, there are all the authorities responsible for ensuring compliance 
with the laws and security of the States, their inhabitants, and the environment. These could 
be the Maritime Authority, Port Authority, Police, Customs, Migration, Ministry of Environment, 
Ministry of Health, among others.  
For the proper function of the state body, there must be a close link between all the 
different authorities, the level of coordination and mutual support must be adequate, focusing 




Chapter 2.4 International instruments related to biosecurity  
 
Instrument Organization Publication Year Objective Description
International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL)
International Maritime Organization 1973/1978
Aims to minimize pollution of the seas, including 
dumping, oil and exhaust pollution. Its stated object is 
“to preserve the marine environment through the 
complete elimination of pollution by oil and other 
harmful substances and the minimization of accidental 
discharge of such substances.”
Annex IV: Prevention of pollution by seawage from ships. contains a set of 
regulations regarding the discharge of sewage into the sea from ships, including 
regulations regarding the ships' equipment and systems for the control of sewage 
discharge, the provision of port reception facilities for sewage, and requirements 
for survey and certification.
Annex V: Prevention of pollution by garbage from Ships. to eliminate and reduce 
the amount of garbage being dumped into the sea from ships. Its terms include 
all kinds of food, domestic and operational waste that are likely to be disposed of 
during the normal operation of the ship.
Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD)
United Nations 1992
International legally-binding treaty with three main 
goals: 
-conservation of biodiversity
-sustainable use of biodiversity 
-fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from 
the use of genetic resources.
The Convention on Biological Diversity covers biodiversity at all levels: 
ecosystems, species and genetic resources. It also covers biotechnology, 
including through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety United Nations (Secretariat of CBD) 2000
International agreement which aims to ensure the safe 
handling, transport and use of living modified organisms 
(LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology that may 
have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also 
into account risks to human health.
Pharmaceutical products.
Procedure for modified living organisms intended for direct use as human or 
animal food or for processing.
Risk assessment.
Risk management.
Handbook of the CBD Secretariat of CBD 2005
Is intended as a reference guide to decisions adopted 
by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biossafety (COP-MOP).
Include the full CBD and protocol.
Rules and procedures for the meetings.
Finantial rules.
Guide to the decisions of the COPs.
Status of member participation.
Declarations.
Nairobi final act.
Decisions ot the COPs.
International Health Regulations World Health Organization 2005
International legal instrument that is binding on 196 
countries across the globe, including all the Member 
States of WHO. Their aim is to help the international 
community prevent and respond to acute public health 







FAO Biosecurity Toolkit Food and Agriculture Organization 2007
To provide practical guidance and support to develop 
and implement national biosecurity frameworks at the 
country level by providing a framework to identify cross-
cutting biosecurity capacity needs.
Biosecurity principles and components.
Guide to asses biosecurity capacity.
An overview and framework manual for biosecurityrisk ananlisis.
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit 
Sharing
Secretariat of CBD 2011
Its aim is the implementation of one of the three 
objectives of the CBD: the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources, thereby contributing to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity.
Response measures.
Deadlines and finatial limits.
Finantial guarantees.






Instrument Organization Publication Year Objective Description
Handbook for inspection of ships and 
issuance of ship sanitation certificates
World Health Organization 2011
Intended to be used as reference material for port 
health officers, regulators, ship operators and other 
competent authorities in charge of implementing the 
IHR (2005) at ports and on ships.
Part A of this document is a reference for pre-inspection planning and 
administrative arrangements for issuing the Ship Sanitation Control Exemption 
Certificate or the Ship Sanitation Control Certificate. Part A describes activities 
that are the responsibility of port health officers, and national or local public 
health authorities. These activities maintain adequate standards for ship 
inspection and issue of SSCs. 
Part B of this document is a template for the inspection and issue of SSCs. It 
describes the areas to be inspected; the relevant standards that apply; the 
possible evidence that may be found or sample results that could constitute a 
public health risk; the documentation that must be reviewed before, during and 
after the inspection process; and control measures or corrective actions that 
must be taken. The format of this template follows the IHR model SSC in Annex 
3 of the IHR (2005). Part B may also be used as reference material for 
regulators, ship operators and ship builders, and serve as a checklist for 
understanding and assessing the potential health impacts of projects involving the 
design of ships. 
Guidelines for the control and 
management of ships' biofouling to 
minimize the transfer of invasive aquatic 
species.
International Maritime Organization 2011
Are intended to provide a globally consistent approach 
to the management of biofouling, which is the 
accumulation of various aquatic organisms on ships’ 
hulls. 
Invasive aquatic species.
Biofouling as a vector for the transfer of invasive aquatic species by ships.
Related international regulatory framework.
The Biofouling Guidelines.
Ship fouling and its management.
Additional benefits from managing biofouling.
Vector surveillance and control at ports, 
airports, and ground crossings
World Health Organization 2016
Provide guidance to Member States on the practical 
aspects of maintaining sanitary standards at 
international borders at ports, airports, and ground 
crossings (points of entry) as set out in the 
International Health Regulations (2005).
Overview of the IHR legal framework.
Purpose and scope, roles and responsibilities.
Important vector- borne diseases and target vector species.
Surveillance and vector control at points of entry.
Emergency measures, monitoring and evaluation.
Handbook for management of public 
health events on board ships
World Health Organization 2016
This document aims to provide technical advice to 
competent authorities at the port level for management 
of public health events on board ships; it complements 
other WHO publications addressing risk assessment at 
the national level, contingency planning at ports, and 
establishment of capacities and application of 
emergency plans at the port level.
Communications.
Event detection.
Preliminary standard responde at the port.
Event risk assessment at the port level.
Response measures.
Options for helath measures.
International Convention for the Control 
and Management of Ships’ Ballast 
Water and Sediments (BWMC)
International Maritime Organization 2017
aims to prevent the spread of harmful aquatic 
organisms  from one region to another, by establishing 
standards and procedures for the management and 
control of ships' ballast water and sediments.
Reception facilities.
Research and monitoring.
Survey, certification and inspection.
Technical assistance.





All States Parties to the IHR 2005 are required to send 
to the WHO a list of all ports authorized by the State 
Party to issue Ship Sanitation Certificates.
List of ports with the capacity to receive foreign ships.
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These regulations will guide the implementation process, dictate guidelines, and 
establish protocols, in order to encourage the governments to take some measures to protect 
their country. Biosecurity has a broad spectrum of influence, different international 
organizations, and different sectors of the state have to deal with it. International regulations 
must be assimilated and adequate to domestic regulations by each member state, according 
to their own characteristics in geopolitics, environment, geography, health management, 



























Chapter 3 Biohazards in the maritime domain 
Over the years, international organizations have been fulfilling their normative function 
in order to establish global standards, consequently order and justice, in safeguard of the 
interests of the states, their populations, private companies and the environment (U.N., n.d.). 
The specialization of each organization set a level playing-field where any external 
stakeholder can avoid or take short cuts compromising security, safety, and environmental 
performance (IMO, n.d.). However, there are some issues that exceed the scope of a single 
international body, so in order to face these issues properly, it is necessary to develop 
interagency work.  
Since biohazards affect different sectors of a State, the development of biosecurity 
policies lie within these sectors too. 
Chapter 3.1 Biosecurity relationship with physical and economic borders 
In previous chapters, entry points were referred to as the points of access for 
biohazards. The borders represent entry and exit gates for almost everything. The borders are 
usually the best opportunity to discover the best and worst of each country, especially talking 
about development and security (IDB, 2010). The “legal resources” (authorized import/export) 
need to travel across borders, but also the “illegal resources” (drugs, smuggling products) that 
contribute to insecurity. In this sense, the starting point for adequately addressing biohazards 
is related to the proper management of borders. 
By referring to borders not necessarily means physical borders, but rather about 
economic borders such as airports, railroads, and ports (entry/exit of cargo and people). In the 
case of this work, we will only refer to ports as maritime economic borders (MEB). 
Global interconnection of economies demands stronger control of MEB by the 
responsible agencies, that means more pressure and stress on the MEB. This control must 
be efficient so as not to detriment or discourage legal commerce and consequently encourage 
competitiveness (IDB, 2014). 
Competent authorities in the borders  
In normal conditions, referring to trade, this responsibility falls on Customs, and 
referring to the movement of people, this responsibility falls on migration. However, there are 
hazards related to these activities, whose responsibility goes beyond customs or migration 
agents. For example, with drug identification, the responsibility lies with the police or coast 
guard; Identification of infectious pathogens, the responsibility lies with the health authority; 
invasive species, the responsibility lies on the environmental authority and maritime authority. 
These examples show that coordination between authorities, joint work, and adequate training 
is needed. 
The objectives of establishing adequate control in the MEB, according to the preceding 
paragraphs are three (WCO, 2015):  
 To ensure the security of the State and its population. 
 To improve economic competitiveness and encourage legal trade 
 To ensure and strengthen international relations.  
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The focus of the present research work will be on the first objective, which, in the 
author's understanding, contributes to the achievement of the other two. 
In the case of customs work in the MEB there are several strategies and tools 
sponsored by the World Customs Organization (WCO), such as the Regulatory Framework 
for Agile and Secure Trade (SAFE Framework) which entered into force in the year 2005 and 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement, regulation carried out in coordination with the WTO in 2014. 
These regulations have their pillars in international collaboration and coordination (customs - 
customs) and collaboration between governments and companies (customs - private sector) 
(IDB, 2014). WCO promotes the concept of Coordinated Border Management (CBM), which 
basically refers to a coordinated approach among all customs agencies worldwide (WCO, 
2015).  
However, customs agents often lack competencies, jurisdiction, and training to 
prevent, identify or address the different threats to biosecurity.  
Actions on MEB is usually the role of the Health Authority, who implement in entry 
points (WHO, 2005). Generally, IHR may be complemented by specific international 
instrument which address hazards that comes from vector and vector-borne, such as malaria, 
dengue, chikungunya, Zika virus, yellow fever (WHO, 2016).  
In conclusion, MEBs are highly vulnerable to biohazards arrival, due to their large 
extent, high capacity of movement of cargo and their location along the coastlines. Therefore, 
it is necessary to have means of monitoring and control, as well as a system of appropriate 
penalties, whether criminal or economic. 
Chapter 3.2 Authorities participating in biological control 
Each Government possesses numerous entities empowered to implement their 
requirements. Each administrative organization has responsibilities, scope of actions, 
functions, jurisdictions, specific regulatory frameworks, competencies and capacities, 
resources and assigned budgets.  
But how such organizations can be connected to enhance the effectiveness of the 
response to biohazards? What happens if one detects any infraction or hazards that compete 
or affect other entities? How should it act? 












Ballast water and biofouling challenges 
Of the several existing ways to transport invasive species in the marine environment, 
the shipping industry has been identified as the most harmful (Hewitt, Campbell, Thresher & 
Martin 1999; Gollasch, 2002). Due to the small size of aquatic microorganisms and their high 
density in ballast water bodies (Carlton, 1985; Olenin, Gollasch, Jonusas & Rimkute 2000; 
Taylor et al. 2007) or biofouling attached in the hull of ships (Lewis, Hewitt, Riddle & McMinn 
2003; Coutts & Taylor, 2004), their transport and introduction into other ecosystems are 
effortless, while their control is a bit more complicated. Therefore, the accidental risk of the 
release of Harmful Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens multiplies exponentially, especially in 
ports (Carlton 1996; Floerl & Inglis l. 2005). 
Both ballast water and biofouling represent significant challenges for the maritime 
community. Because regulations and instruments are recent. Technology, protocols, and 
procedures require further validation on a long-term basis. For example, the determination of 
representative sampling and the detail of sample analysis remains challenging in the context 
of Ballast Water Management Convention (BWMC).  
Biofouling is complex to address because it represents technical, scientific, 
environmental and economic challenges (UNDP, 2019). The Glofouling initiative with the 
collaboration of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), and the IMO, work together to identify solutions.  
Biohazard Sector involved Authorities involved International instruments related International Organization
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority SOLAS/IMDG code IMO





Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Drug regulations N/A
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance 
of ship sanitation certificates.
WHO
Medical waste Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance 
of ship sanitation certificates.
WHO
Pest/vectors Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
Vector surveillance and control at ports, 
airports, and ground crossings.
WHO
Ministry of Defense/Transport Maritime/port authority MLC/STCW IMO/ILO




Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance 
of ship sanitation certificates.
Handbook for management of public health 
events on board ships.
WHO
Ministry of Internal Affairs Migrations Migratory regulations N/A
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority MARPOL annex V IMO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance 
of ship sanitation certificates.
Vector surveillance and control at ports, 
airports, and ground crossings.
WHO
Ministry of Environment Environmental Authority
CBD & protocol
Garbage dispostion regulations SCBD
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority MARPOL annex IV IMO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance 
of ship sanitation certificates.
WHO
Ministry of Environment Environmental Authority CBD & protocol SCBD
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority BWMC IMO/GESAMP
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance 
of ship sanitation certificates.
WHO
Ministry of Environment Environmental Authority CBD & protocol
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority Biofouling Guidelines -resolution MEPC.207(62 GEF/UNDP/IMO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR.
Handbook for inspection of ships and issuance 
of ship sanitation certificates.
WHO









The project consists of carrying out awareness campaigns aimed at all economic 
sectors linked to the sea, including recreational navigation, through a “global alliance of 
industries” (UNDP, 2019). However, on the side of technological development, nothing has 
been found yet that exceeds former results provided by antifouling paint systems (Chiavarini, 
Ubaldi & Cannarsa, 2014). 
To summarize, different authorities are involved in the biosecurity regime of any 
country which requires appropriate levels of coordination.  
Chapter 3.3 The relevance of Biosecurity approach promoted by FAO 
The maritime sector is moving from a purely reactive (e.g., Titanic and SOLAS) to a 
more proactive and preventive sector. Although there is still a long way to go, some examples 
such as Polar Code or the Goal-based ship construction standard open possibilities. 
The development of preventive measures is required in order to develop a suitable risk 
analysis. The risk analysis consists of three distinct but closely related components: risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication (FAO, 2007). 
The risk assessment for biosecurity means conducting a scientific process through 
which you can estimate the risks to life and health, biodiversity, and the environment (FAO, 
2007). But how can risks be assessed if each authority has a different perception of them? 
With a harmonized and integrated policy.  
The risk management is the decision-making process in an environment of uncertainty. 
For this, the information collected during the risk assessment is used as well as socially 
determined measures (FAO, 2007). 
The risk communication is the exchange in real-time, of the information obtained and 
processed in the two previous components, between the people responsible for taking 
measures before the possible biohazard that they are going to or could possibly face (FAO, 
2007). 
FAO biosecurity approaches 
FAO indicates in its toolkit (2007) that there are two types of biosecurity approaches, 
traditional and integrated:  
The traditional approach gives priority to sectorial biosecurity management 
which means that each sector of the state (health, environment, defense, fisheries, 
agriculture, livestock, homeland security, among others) develop their own regulations, 
protocols, and procedures separately, focusing on achieving their own goals (FAO, 
2007). Such an approach may disconnect each sector if no exchange mechanisms are 
put in place. 
The integrated approach promotes a harmonized and integrated 
multidisciplinary way to work, where under a single national legislation, each sector of 
the state is assigned functions, responsibilities, and jurisdiction, in order to achieve all 
the objectives that are common to all the sectors (FAO, 2007). 
Due to the constant growth of biohazards, FAO encourages the development of 
integrative and harmonized policies. 
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Although FAO invites states to develop a harmonized approach to address biohazards, 
it will be up to the State to choose which approach is more suitable to their national context 
(e.g., economic, geopolitics, society, legislation, technological and scientific capacity). Some 
national organizations can be seen in table 4 and appendices 2 to 5. 
Table 4, self‐elaboration. Source: “Biosecurity The Socio‐Politics of Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases.” (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013) 
To be a feasible process, some requirements must be set, regardless of the approach 
chosen: 
 To establish clear national policies with appropriate objectives which facilitate the 
opportune assessment of the risks that affect biosecurity. 
 Effective legal framework, which provides support to the authorities responsible for 
ensuring the security of the nation and compliance with the corresponding 
regulations, always respecting the rule of law. 
 A clear institutional framework is needed to identify competent authorities and their 
respective responsibilities. 
 Communications and the exchange of information between the parties involved, 
including the private sector. 
 Infrastructure, technical and scientific capacity support risk assessment (FAO, 
2007).  
Chapter 3.4 Biosecurity framework of actions 
Current biosecurity practices require the implementation of preventive measures as in 
the past (e.g., Ragusa port restrictions) (Gensini, Yacoub & Conti, 2004).  
According to Barker, Taylor, and Dobson (2013), a way of understanding where and 
on who the responsibilities about biosecurity lie, is by defining the place where the strategies, 
protocols, and procedures should be applied.  
Any biosecurity strategy requires the implementation of measures at pre-entry or pre-
border (prevention), point of entry or border (control and inspection), and post-entry or post-
border (mitigation, monitoring, and protection) (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013).  
Following the literature and practice of certain countries (e.g., Australia), the author of 
this research work deems this three-stage approach to be suitable for maritime needs. MEB 
represent the entry/border to develop and implement pre-arrival, at arrival and post-arrival 
measures. In the case of Peruvian inspections process will be easier to assign responsibilities, 
functions, and jurisdictions to the competent authorities because there is already some 
technological tools in place, such as single windows, which will allow handling of all information 








Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry
 (DAFF)
 2013
·    To develop and implement policies and programs to ensure Australia's agricultural, fisheries, food and 
     forestry industries remain competitive, profitable and sustainable, and supports the sustainable and
     productive management and use of rivers and water resources. 
·    To predict, preventing and managing risks related to food.
·    To predict, preventing and managing the risks related to plant health and agricultural production.
·    To promote animal health and welfare.
·    Biosecurity New Zealand's focus is on stopping pests and diseases at the border, before they get to New 
     Zealand, and eradicating or managing the impact of those already here.
·    With the help of New Zealanders, they ensure their unique environments and the value of their primary
     industries are maintained. 
Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA). ·    Understand the biological risks that we face today and could face in the future. 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS). ·    Prevent biological risks from emerging (where possible) or from threatening the UK and UK interests. 
Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC). ·    Detect, characterize and report biological risks when they do emerge as early and reliably as possible. 
Department for International
·    Respond to biological risks that have reached the UK or UK interests to lessen their impact and allow the
     rapid return to business as usual. 
Development (DFID).
Ministry of Defense (MOD)…et al.
United Kingdom traditional  2018
Finland integrated Finish Food Authority (EVIRA) 2019 
New Zealand integrated Ministry for Primary Industry (MPI) 2004 
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Chapter 3.4.1  Pre-arrival. 
This stage starts from the previous port where the ship loaded its goods or/and 
embarked passengers. It represents the first challenge for all biosecurity systems as accurate 
data must be provided by the ship in order for the authorities to be able to identify the risks 
prior to ship arrival and implement preventive measures. At this stage, biohazard begins its 
journey. 
Some type of goods that may affect the biosecurity of the visited country must be 
previously declared, such as fruits, unwashed clothes, or shoes. There is also some kind of 
discomfort or illness that must be monitored, among other things (WHO, 2005). 
However, local authorities must be cautious not to interfere with commercial activities 
unnecessarily. Any implementation in biosecurity systems should not be restrictive to 
international trade (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013). At this point WTO plays an important role, 
being the trade regulatory body and resolving conflicts that may exist within the framework of 
its competences, without affecting the sovereignty of the states and their national security 
rules. 
Chapter 3.4.2 At-arrival. 
In this stage, the necessary inspections are carried out on people, luggage, cargo, and 
the ship, including all its systems and subsystems, in order to identify any biological hazards 
that can be introduced intentionally or unintentionally (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013).  
It is a critical stage and requires a lot of training and professionalism from the 
responsible authorities in addition to do a proper risk assessment (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 
2013). At this stage, potential biohazards should be identified if there are any. 
If any type of biohazards is detected during this stage, all biosecurity services 
established for this purpose should be deployed immediately (WHO, 2005).  
Chapter 3.4.3  Post-arrival. 
This stage consists of following up on the potential biological hazards once the MEB 
is crossed. Indeed, many hazards may not have been seen or identified previously, such as 
the case of invasive species (WHO, 2005).  
Monitoring and alert systems have to be developed and implemented with the support 
of authorities but also universities, research centers, and ordinary citizens (Barker, Taylor & 
Dobson, 2013). At this stage, authorities should deal with potential biohazards. 
The involvement of citizens will facilitate early detection and continuous monitoring at 
a reasonable cost. Education and dissemination of the information play a vital role in the 
country's biosecurity strategy. For example, in the United Kingdom, fishermen perform the 
function of collecting seawater samples, becoming a powerful tool for massive data collection 
(Kinver, 2015). 
Using the definitions of each of the three stages previously described, the author of this 




 This framework of actions for biosecurity must be reinforced through trust between 
different states. The use of the same international standards generates confidence between 
States. This trust will be reflected through bilateral or multilateral agreements. However, this 
does not mean that you should take down your guard against potential biological hazards but 
instead turn it into a global strategy through these agreements.
34 
 




   Strong organizational structure.
 Different risk assessments, contingency plans, and objectives between
authorities on the same topic.
   Highly trained & specialized workers.   Lack of coordination between stakeholders (authorities & private sector).
   Easy monitoring of their own functions.   No proper channels of communications between authorities.
   Good internal communication.   Excessive bureaucracy & easily fall in corruption.
   Clear internal hierarchy levels.
  Overlapping of jurisdictions, responsibilities, budget & functions between 
   different authorities (unclear laws).
   Well established institutional framework.   Not well-defined chain of command during a national emergency.
   Infrastructure already in place.
  Goals & objectives are results-oriented only, without focusing on the process;
   this creates chaos & disorder (quantitative results).
OPPORTUNITIES POSSIBILITIES SO POSSIBILITIES WO
   Willingness of some authorities and particulars to collaborate.
   To develop national educative programs, in order to involve all inhabitants, 
    organizations & companies in the process.
  To develop strong and complementary regulations.
   Improve the organizational structures, planning & execution process.    To improve the monitoring system by involving other organizations.   To establish a sanction & penalty system.
   The commitment of the political body.    To develop a joint training program.
  To create a multisectoral teamwork in order to assess the risks, share 
    knowledge & elaborate joint plans.
   To educate inhabitants in order to contribute to national protection.
   To promote periodical report meetings with all stakeholders (governmental
    & private sector).
  To create a national fund to support biosecurity operations.
   To involve the whole nation in the mitigation of the biological hazards.    To develop a proper policy framework.   To delimitate jurisdiction, responsibilities & functions between organizations.
   To cover some expenses generated due to biosecurity operations,
    by using a sanctions & penalties system (who made the damage
    pay).
  To establish accurate communication channels & data exchange systems.
THREATS CHALLENGES ST CHALLENGES WT
        Continued growth of shipping industry & biological hazards.    To assign budget in accordance of the achievements.   To commit the workers with the objectives.
        The plan usually is done in the most likely scenario.    To integrate all the national resources in one national contingency plan.   To develop a culture of collaboration between authorities.
        No on-time communication of the biological hazards to other 
       authorities.
   To develop a proper institutional framework.   To develop a proper legal framework.
        Insufficient logistic support.    To develop joint protocols & procedures.   Automation of some processes to reduce bureaucracy & eliminate corruption.
        Insufficient authorities budget to face the problem.
        Conventional workers are not involved with the objectives.
        Risks assessment is only focus in their area (blindness of other
       sectors).
        Professional zeal conduct to hide information.







  Clear policy, legal & institutional framework.   Insufficient financial and technical resources.
  All organizations work to reach common objectives.   Poor collaboration culture between competent authorities.
  Well-defined jurisdiction, responsibilities & functions.   Local & national priorities could be different.
  Well-defined competent authorities.
  To many authorities, NGOs & private companies dealing with the same 
    hazard.
 Clear channels of communications and coordination between different
organizations and easy access.
  Participation of all state sector, including private & NGOs.
  Same national contingency plan for all organizations.
  Highly trained, committed & specialized workers.
  All organization participate in risk assessment process.
  Common data collection & exchange of information system.
  Broad geographical coverage (National, regional & local).
  Focus on both process (quality) & results (quantity).
OPPORTUNITIES POSSIBILITIES SO POSSIBILITIES WO
  Interdisciplinary nature of biosecurity promotes synergies &
complementarities in organizations daily work.
   To enhance international trade.    To assign a sufficient budget in order to increase technical capabilities.
   Higher levels of public participation in the biosecurity system. 
   To improve the protection of the public health, agriculture, livestock & 
    environment.
   To provide cost-efficient government services.
  Avoid budget redundancy, better use of economic resources.    To protect the national economy.    To develop a culture of collaboration between authorities.
   Involvement of the workers in all the process.    To improve sanitary measures.    To promote national wide access to biosecurity information.
   Simplification of national regulations.    To increase the scope of biosecurity systems.    To develop a strong monitoring & surveillance system.
   Rationalization of controls & technical capabilities.    To develop a proper risk assessment with periodical updates.    To develop a harmonized certification system.
   Privatization of some biosecurity services.    To develop trust between industries & the government.
   To reduce bureaucratic barriers.    To enhance the ability to achieve national biosecurity objectives.
   To develop a national integrated response to biosecurity problems.
THREATS CHALLENGES ST CHALLENGES WT
   Continued growth of shipping industry & biological hazards.    To cope all economical borders.    To share knowledge between authorities.
   Absence of professionals in the sector.
  To develop new international strategic alliances (bilateral or multilateral
agreements).
   To develop new organizational controls.
   Professional zeal conduct to hide information.    To increase the identification capacity of biological hazards.    To delegate some biosecurity functions to privates.
   Corruption.    To improve public awareness related to biological hazards.    To promote capacity building according to international perspective.
   High initial investment & operational budget.    To map all biological hazard pathways.





The development of these matrices were carried out for the author after the analysis 
of the concepts, theories, and affirmations extracted from the books and publications used 































Chapter 4 Biosecurity in Peru. 
The first question that must be answered in this chapter is why is it essential to consider 
National policies related to biosecurity in the Peruvian maritime sector? As already mentioned 
in Chapter 2, it is crucial to have these policies due to the negative impact on human and 
animal health, biodiversity and the national economy (Barker, Taylor & Dobson, 2013). 
Peru has had several dramatic episodes to face such as the 1991 Cholera outbreak 
and several reported invasions.  
Among the effects, invasive species produce on natural ecosystems are the 
introduction of diseases, changes in the composition of biological communities, and the 
displacement of local species by competition and predation (Davis, 2009).  
The case of the microalgae Dydimo (Didymosphenia geminata) impacts freshwater 
aquatic ecosystems such as rivers and lakes where it has been introduced (southern Peru). 
This species has a high reproduction rate that allows it to form extensive blooms, which makes 
it not only an invasive species but also harmful to the ecosystem (Spaulding & Elwell, 2007). 
The case of rainbow trout is also emblematic of uncontrolled invasion in water systems. 
Being an exporting and importing country, Peru is highly exposed to the introduction 
of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens. In addition, the country is vulnerable mainly 
because of its dependence on the fishing sector - 7% of Peruvian exports (SNP, 2019), and 
each citizen consumes approximately 14.5 kilograms of fish per year (PRODUCE, 2018), and 
tourism, one of the most visited countries in South America (MINCETUR, 2019).  
In that sense, a biosecurity gap could lead to losses of life, irreparable damage to 
biodiversity, and a significant economic crisis.  
Finally, the 1991 “Cholera outbreak” is by its own a clear justification for enhanced 
maritime biosecurity considerations. 
Chapter 4.1 1991 cholera outbreak response 
In a report, the WHO indicates that around 100 outbreaks of diseases in the world are 
associated with trade through ships between 1970 and 2003 (Rooney et al., 2004).  
 The cholera epidemic of 1991 in Peru was the result of the extension of the seventh 
pandemic initiated in the Celebes (Sulawesi) in 1961, which reached North to Korea, West to 
Africa and South Europe (Maguiña, Seas, Galán & Santana, 2010). The first recorded case 
occurred in the fishing port of Chancay located 60 km north of Lima (Petrera, 1993). The 
source of the pathogen originates from a country around the Indian Ocean (Maguiña, Seas, 
Galán & Santana, 2010). The bacteria may have traveled with ballast water, biofouling, or 
sewage. 
The primary carrier of cholera bacteria is the human being; however, it also can be 
found in phytoplankton and zooplankton in saline and fresh waters (Borroto, 1997).  
Almost at the same time as cholera appeared in Chancay, there was a significant 
increase in the number of adults treated for diarrhea in Chimbote (Ancash), another important 
port in Peru. The disease followed the route from south to north (Maguiña, Seas, Galán & 




At the V Pan American Congress of Infectology, held in Lima, the Health National 
Institute (HNI) reported about the isolation of cholera bacteria in fish, shellfish and 
phytoplankton and zooplankton, in areas near the water collectors along the coast (Carrillo, 
1991). 
Biosecurity procedures in 1991. 
In 1991, when a ship came from a foreign port, it had to submit all the relevant 
documentation to the local Harbor Master. This documentation was presented between 3 to 1 
days before arrival, depending on the type of cargo of the ship, having the corresponding 
authorities to review it, analyze it and prepare for the reception of the ship (Congress, 1996). 
These are the basics of a pre-arrival risk assessment. It can be assumed that the 
documentation analysis did not show any sign of diseases on board. 
The ship's reception committee was chaired by the MA and included the HA, customs, 
and migrations (Congress, 1996). If this was a fishing vessel and did not enter the port, it was 
not received. However, to carry out its fishing operations in Peruvian waters, the ship must 
hold a navigation permit granted by the MA, prior inspection at its port of origin (safety of 
navigation, International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate and sewage) (President, 2005) 
and permission of fishing, granted by the Ministry of Production, prior payment of fees and 
presentation of documentation (PRODUCE, 2018). 
In 1991 the BWM convention was not yet into force, nor the Biofouling guidelines 
existed, and Peru only had ratified the MARPOL annexes I, II and V. In the health sector IHR 
of 1969 was not precise in the procedures, and FAO Biosecurity toolkit did not exist. 
 Therefore, insufficient development of national maritime regulations and procedures, 
added to the socio-political situation in Peru around those years diverted the attention of the 
state apparatus towards what they considered as a priority for the government at that time 
(internal conflicts), leaving the maritime field vulnerable. 
As the biological threat and its origin could not be established in a timely manner, its 
precise source was not identified. However, it is inevitable that the bacteria arrived by sea 
(McCarthy & Khambathy, 1994). Between 1991 and 1992, several studies of the non-potable 
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waters (ballast, sewage, and bilge) of ships that arrived on the Gulf of Mexico in the United 
States were conducted. The Cholera bacteria with the same biochemical characteristics were 
found on ships coming from ports around the Indian Ocean (McCarthy & Khambathy, 1994). 
The measures were taken once the bacteria was in Peru which aimed to protect the 
population. To achieve these objectives, a large-scale campaign of oral rehydration was 
carried out. A dissemination and education campaign about preventive measures was also 
carried out (Maguiña, Seas, Galán & Santana, 2010). These activities only involved the 
Ministry of Health, with the support of the Ministry of Education, local governments and all 
media (see figure 8). 
Figure 8, Infographic “Kill cholera before the Cholera kill you.” Source: www.minsa.gob.pe 
It can be affirmed that the measures taken “post-arrival” were protective but reactive. 
It entailed mainly of containment and succeeded to control the spread. Even so, this disease 
generated 321,334 cases in 1991 only (See table 7) and economic losses of around US $ 
489,424 million for the Peruvian state (Petrera & Montoya, 1993). 
Table 7, Epidemiological information of cholera in America, 1991. Source: www.who.org 











Peru 22,002,856         321,334 1,460.42 13.21 0.9 28-Dec-91
Ecuador 9,622,700           44,126 458.56 6.98 1.52 14-Dec-91
Colombia 31,997,520         11,218 35.06 0.63 1.8 14-Dec-91
USA 251,400,000       24 0.01 0 0 13-Dec-91
Brasil 141,500,000       937 0.66 0.01 2.13 21-Dec-91
Chile 12,400,000         41 0.33 0.02 4.88 5-Jan-92
Mexico 81,900,000         2,605 3.18 0.04 1.31 14-Dec-91
Guatemala 8,400,000           3,530 42.02 0.56 1.33 21-Dec-91
El Salvador 5,300,000           921 17.38 0.64 3.69 21-Dec-91
Bolivia 8,000,000           175 2.19 0.15 6.86 23-Dec-91
Panama 2,300,000           1,177 51.17 1.26 2.46 28-Dec-91
Honduras 4,700,000           11 0.23 0 0 25-Dec-91
Venezuela 18,800,000         13 0.07 0.01 15.38 27-Dec-91
Nicaragua 3,500,000           11 0.31 0 0 28-Dec-91
TOTAL 601,823,076       386,123 64.14 0.65 1.01
40 
 
 In summary, the main routes of transmission had been contaminated water, the 
inadequate preparation of food, including the intake of shellfish and raw fish (Brandling, Libel 
& Migliónico, n.d.).  
At the pre-arrival stage, no adequate information was collected, enabling risk assessment, 
and thus developing preventive measures.  
In the arrival stage during the reception and dispatch of the ship, no irregularity was identified 
because the ship received the corresponding free practice and departure authorization. There 
is no record in the MA files that indicates any negative incident onboard (archives of the 
Captaincy of Puerto del Callao in Peru).  
In the post-arrival stage, what was done was to decrease the mortality rate and prevent the 
spread of the bacteria (see figure 9). 
Figure 9, Self‐elaboration “Strategy used during the Cholera outbreak.” Source: Cholera History (Maguiña, Seas, Galán & Santana, 2010). 
Chapter 4.2 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities 
During this research, it was possible to identify three sectors (See figure 10) linked with 
the Peruvian biosecurity regime: 
 The environmental sector, which mainly focuses on protecting, human, animal, 
and plant health, and environment but more related to food safety and invasive 
species. 
 Health sector, which focuses on protecting the health of the inhabitants. 
 Maritime sector, which also seeks to protect the health of the inhabitants and 
the environment.  
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 The health sector supports the other two sectors but not vice versa (no documented 
evidence was found). However, every sector has developed its own regulations that, in many 
cases overlap responsibilities, create redundancy of efforts or even generate biosecurity gaps. 
Figure 10, self‐elaboration. “Sectors with regulations related to biosecurity.” Sources: Peruvian domestic regulations. (Law N° 28611; Law N° 26842; D.L. N° 1147). 
Chapter 4.2.1 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities in   
      the environmental sector. 
 The Political Constitution of Peru (1993), in its title III “Economic Regime,” and chapter 
II, “Environment and natural resources,” articles 67 and 68, establishes the legal framework 
for environmental and natural resources issues: 
 Article 67 The State determines the national environmental policy. Promotes 
 sustainable use of natural resources. 
 Article 68 The State is obliged to promote the conservation of biological diversity and 
 protected natural areas. 
 In May 2008, the Ministry of Environment (Legislative Decree D.L. N° 1013) was 
created and in compliance with article 67 of the Political Constitution of Peru, on May 22, 2009, 
Supreme Decree DS-012-2009-MINAM the National Environmental Policy (see appendix 6) 
was approved.  
With these National Scope regulations, the government set the starting point for the 
development of further environmental regulations. However, these regulations still remain too 
broad in scope. The National Environmental Policy, state that all competent authorities shall 
take actions regarding the protection of the environment and biodiversity, but who are the 
competent authorities?  
This means that any authority that feels it has competences in accordance with this 
national policy can develop its own institutional regulations, which creates disorder and 
confusion of the objectives and responsibilities. 
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National Environment Council (CONAM) 
 The National Environmental Council (CONAM), is the National Environmental 
Authority of Peru and governing body of the National Environmental Management System, 
and the focal point between SCBD and the national bodies, it is also responsible for promoting, 
adequate and implement international instruments into domestic legislation (Laws No. 28245 
and No. 28611 - see appendix 7). Its institutional mission is to promote sustainable 
development, promoting the balance between economic growth, social welfare, and 
environmental protection. It constitutes a decentralized public body attached to the scope of 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 
 To meet its objectives, CONAM coordinates the design and application of the National 
Environmental Policy with all State institutions, including those of the national, regional and 
local levels of government, encouraging the participation of the private sector and civil society. 
 In order to adequately fulfill the international commitments assumed (CBD and Its 
protocol), CONAM has developed an environmental policy and management instruments, 
which must promote the system of environmental control, monitoring, and surveillance, 
economic and financial instruments.  
Law on Prevention of Risks Derived from the use of  Biotechnology – N° 
27104. 
This law has the following objectives: to protect human health, the environment and 
biological diversity; promote safety in research and development of biotechnology; regulate, 
manage and control the risks arising from the confined use and release of LMOs; and, regulate 
the exchange and commercialization of LMOs, both within the country and with the rest of the 
world. 
Subsequently, on October 28, 2002, through the Supreme Decree D.S. N°108-2002-
PCM, its Statute was approved. This document establishes as competent Sector Authorities 
(CSA): The National Agricultural Research Institute (INIA) for the agriculture sector, today 
INIEA; Vice Ministry of Fisheries of PRODUCE for fishing sector and the General Directorate 
of Environmental Health (DIGESA) for the health sector.  
This regulation indicates that it is the function of CSAs to comply with and enforce the 
provisions related to biosecurity and biotechnology established in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Law N° 27104, its statute and other national or international complementary 
provisions related to the subject. The CONAM is the instance of transectoral coordination and 
the focal point for the Cartagena Protocol on biosecurity and for the Information Exchange 
Center (Biosafety Clearing House).  
National Institute of Agricultural Research and Extension  (INIEA). 
Competent Sector Authority related to Agriculture. 
This authority established the Internal regulations for the development of activities on 
LMOs or their derived products of agricultural origin. The Regulation has as a general objective 
to regulate activities to guarantee the safety of biotechnology in relation to agricultural LMOs 
and their derived products. 
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INIEA should be the authority responsible for ensuring food safety of the exported 
product, generating trust in the importer country. The certification granted by INEA is the start 
point to avoid biohazards shipment to another country.  
General Directorate of Environmental Health (DIGESA). 
Competent Sector Authority related to Health. 
 This authority, which belongs to the Ministry of Health, developed the internal 
biosecurity regulation for the development of activities with products derived from LMOs for 
human consumption. The regulation has as a general objective to regulate the activities to 
guarantee the safety of biotechnology in products derived from LMOs for human consumption, 
according to the existing legal framework for this. 
 The directorate also indicates that the risk analysis will be carried out on a case-by-
case basis for each product derived from LMOs. The transport and packaging of products 
derived from LMOs destined for human consumption of national production or import matter 
will also be carried out in accordance with the provisions that emanate from the risk analysis. 
 DIGESA has as an additional function through the Directorate of Metaxhenic Diseases 
and Zoonoses (one of its STGs). It is responsible for identitying and coordinating the strategic 
interventions for prevention, control, and reduction of risks and damages caused by vector-
borne diseases (Metaxhenic) and contagious diseases from animals to humans (zoonoses). 
Ministry of Production, Vice Ministry of Fisheries.          
Competent Sector Authority related to fisheries. 
 This authority developed the internal biosecurity regulation for the development of 
activities on LMOs of hydro-biological origin. The general objective of the regulation is to 
establish biosecurity procedures to regulate the development of generation, research, pilot-
level use, production, marketing education, confined use, storage, transportation, import, 
transit, disposal, and any other use or handling of LMOs, guaranteeing the safe use of Modern 
Biotechnology. 
The Institute of the Sea of Peru (IMARPE) is a Specialized Technical Organization of 
the Ministry of Production and is part of the Sector Technical Group (STG) of the Vice-Ministry 
of Fisheries. 
IMARPE oriented its scientific research to study the Peruvian sea and its resources, to 
advise the State in making decisions regarding the rational use of fishery resources and 
conservation of the marine environment, actively contributing to the development of the 
country. Under this approach, IMARPE investigates the relationship between fishery 
resources, the environment, and fishing activity. The aim is to provide advice related to 
management of resources and the marine environment, in respect to sustainable 





 In addition, CONAM has four support bodies, whose functions are to advise on the 
development of instruments and their implementation. These bodies are National Commission 
of Biological Diversity (CONADIB), National Advisory Commission of Biosecurity 
(CONABIOS), National Biosecurity Structural Framework Support Projects, and Technical 
Committee for Biosecurity Standardization in Living Modified Organisms (CTN-BOVM-
INDECOPI). See figure 11. 
Figure 11, Organizational Chart of the National Biosecurity Structural Framework. Source: National Environment Council 
Chapter 4.2.2 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities in 
               the Health sector. 
 Social protection of health is a non-delegable responsibility of the State, and it is its 
duty to determine the national health policy (Congreso, 1993). For this, the HA must exercise 
vigorous leadership in the government and the strategic management of health in the maritime 
sector. In this sense, HA must have control of risks and associated diseases and execute the 
corresponding sanitary and epidemiological surveillance. 
General law of health – Law N° 26842. 
  According to this law, the Ministry of Health is the National Health Authority, and the 
Regional Governments acts as Regional Health Authority - RHA (Congreso, 1997). 
 In Title III, Chapter IV, Article 82 to 86, this law indicates that the HA will exercise 
National and International control of communicable diseases in accordance with national 
regulations and international regulations ratified by the State, such as IHR and all related 
instruments. The implementation and control of IHR mandates lie over the General Directorate 
of Health Operations and its Regional Health Directorates along with the Peruvian territory. 
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To accomplish these aims, it will have to establish an adequate control and sanitary 
surveillance of the borders, monitoring endemic diseases, restrict the entry of products, 
people, even the realization of activities that represent a risk to the health of the country. 
In Title III, Chapter VI, Article 96 and 97, this law indicates that the HA has jurisdiction 
over import and export products when any of these may affect human and animal health or 
the environment. 
In Title III, Chapter VIII, Article 103 and 104, indicate that in order to protect the 
environment, any natural or legal person is impeded from discharging waste or polluting 
substances into the sea. 
National Health Plan – Ministry Resolution M.R.589-2007/MINSA 
This plan lists and describes health policies, details of the objectives, goals, and 
strategies for the implementation of each of the policies in relation to health problems, and the 
health system. The Plan is based on the international State commitments regarding health 
and the national health law. It has established 8 objectives of which objective number 7 is 
related to the subject under investigation: “Ensure environmental sustainability, incorporating 
the principles of sustainable development into national policies and programs and reverse the 
loss of environmental resources.” 
National Health Authority or Ministry of Heath – Law N° 27657  
HA is responsible for the direction and management of the National Health Policy (NHP) and 
acts as the highest regulatory authority on health. This authority is also responsible for has 








Regional Health Authority or Regional Government – Law N° 27657 
RHA is responsible for the implementation of the NHP and can develop supplementary 
regulations in order to achieve national objectives. This authority has the following 
organization in relation to biosecurity, see figure 13. 
Figure 13, Organizational structure of the Regional Health Directorates. Source: https://www.minsa.gob.pe 
Chapter 4.2.3 Distribution of regulations and competent authorities in 
               the Maritime sector. 
The MEB in Peru occupies a great extension, and is able to maintain an active control 
and surveillance of them, a combination of different resources (human, material and 
organizational) is needed. In that sense, the Peruvian state has organized itself in the following 
way to be able to face the biohazards from the MEB: 
Maritime Authority – Peruvian Navy - Ministry of Defense – Legislative Decree D.L. 
N°1147 
 The General Directorate of Captaincies and Coastguard is the National Maritime 
Authority, and it has the organizational structure, as shown in figure 14. Its functions related 
to biosecurity are: 
 To ensure the safety and security of human life at sea. 
 To prevent and combat pollution, as well as protect the aquatic environment according 
to international instruments ratified by the state and environmental National standards.  
In accordance with this Legislative Decree, the MA wields Port State Control (PSC). 
The PSC officer supervises foreign-flagged ships in national ports with the purpose of verifying 
the statutory certification of the ships evidencing compliance with the minimum security and 















 MA is involved in the reception and dispatch of ships. With this function, the country 
ensures that the ship which arrived at any national port may not represent a hazard to the 
national security, safety, and environment. 
Port Authority - Ministry of Transport – Law N° 27943 
The National Port Authority (PA) is a decentralized public in charge of the National Port 
System (APN, 2016). The PA is responsible for the development of the National Port System, 
the promotion of private investment in ports and the coordination of the different public or 
private actors involved in port activities and services. 
Its objective is to establish and consolidate a strong maritime community port that links 
all agents of maritime-port development, state and private, with a common goal: strengthening 
the competitiveness of national ports to face the phenomenon of globalization and the 
challenges posed by the need to develop their export sector fully. 
The link between PA and the biosecurity system is the port reception facility described 
in the Directorial Resolution R.D. N°087-2013-MTC-16 and the control and monitoring of 
dangerous goods inside the port facility described in Directory Resolution Assembly RAD 
N°020-2006-APNDIR.  
National Superintendence of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT) – Ministry of 
Economy and Finance – Law N° 24829 
 The main objective of SUNAT is the management, inspection, and control of customs 
policy in the national territory, ensuring the correct application of international treaties and 
conventions and other rules that govern the matter. The link between SUNAT and the 
biosecurity regime is the cargo inspected by them. In this regard, their specific objectives 
related to biosecurity are: 
 To control and verify the traffic of goods, no matter what their origin and nature at the 
national level. 
 To inspect the international traffic of people and means of transport. 




International Maritime Health Department (IMHD) – Directorial Resolution R.D. N°051-
2000-SA-DS-CALLAO/ DG 
It is the line department of the Executive Directorate of International Health (EDIH) in 
Callao - Lima. Its main aims are: 
 To Plan, organize, direct, and supervise the Maritime Health actions of Callao 
Port. 
 Ensure effective compliance with epidemiological surveillance measures in the 
area of Maritime Health jurisdiction. 
 Supervise sanitary and epidemiological controls in case of diseases that are 
subject to regulation. 
 Ensure compliance with national and international standards and regulations. 
 Maintain proper coordination with the International Health Organizations and 
equivalent Authorities of other countries. 
 Coordinate the health actions of the Maritime Health, with the other competent 
sectors. 
 Keep the Regional Health Directorate of Callao permanently informed about 
the notification of diseases, vectors, food, and the accounting movement of the 
Maritime Health Service. 
 Supervise the medical and technical staff of environmental sanitation at the 
reception and dispatch office. 
 Represent the Regional Health Director of Callao in the necessary coordination 
with the competent authorities of the sector.  
The EDIH only exists in the Region of Callao (see figure 13), in the other regions along 
the Peruvian coast, the local government designate a doctor of the nearest hospital to the port 
in order to comply with these functions of the HA. 
The IMHD provides four different services (see figure 15) to the shipping industry in 
accordance with its “Administrative procedures Manual” (GRC, 2018): 
 Ship Sanitation Control Certificate (provided by private companies). 
 Ship Sanitation Control Exemption Certificate (provided by private companies). 
 Free practice. 




Chapter 4.2.4 Compiled of competent authorities according to  
               biohazards in the Peruvian biosecurity regime. 
Table 8, self‐elaboration, “Peruvian Competent Authorities by biohazard.” 
To summarize: 
The environmental sector, through CONAM (focal contact point with the SCBD), 
performs functions focused on environmental protection related to food security, agriculture, 
and livestock. Its aim is to control and supervise LMOs that may affect the health of people, 
animals, and plants, as well as the environment. However, the approach of the legislation 
related to this sector is intended to ensure the market subsistence of the products obtained 
from agricultural and livestock activities. 
For example, of the three CSAs in the environmental sector, INIEA is responsible for 
certifying the products to be exported in accordance with international standards, and ensuring 
that they are safe for human consumption. The other two sectors are DIGESA and the Vice-
Ministry of Fisheries through IMARPE. The former provides scientific evidence about livestock 
conditions, and the latter, the health, and stock of fish and biochemical conditions of the sea. 
  
Until this point, it was not possible to find any connection between the environmental 
sector and the maritime one. Even though this sector was responsible for the development of 
the National Biosecurity Policy (NBP) (See appendix 8), they did not include in their regulations 
and procedures any activity in order to assess the biohazards (invasive species) that come 
from ballast water, biofouling or sewage. In addition, the environmental authority does not 
participate in the maritime sector inspections regime (see table 8). 
The Health sector plays an essential role in the national biosecurity regime because it 
provides support to the other two sectors. As already mentioned, DIGESA is the specialized 
health entity that helps CONAM to accomplish with CBD and its protocol mandates. EDIH in 
the Maritime sector is the specialized health which helps the HA to accomplish with IHR and 
Biohazard Ministry involved Authorities involved International instruments related International Organization
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime / Port authority SOLAS / IMDG code IMO
Ministry of finance SUNAT
SAFE Framework;Trade Facilitation Agreement
IMDG code
WCO/IMO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and 
issuance of ship sanitation certificates. WHO
Medical waste Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and 
issuance of ship sanitation certificates. WHO
Pest/vectors Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
Vector surveillance and control at ports, airports, 
and ground crossings.
WHO
Ministry of Defense/Transport Maritime / Port authority MLC-2006 / STCW IMO/ILO
Ministry of Finance SUNAT SAFE Framework; Trade Facilitation Agreement. WCO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and 
issuance of ship sanitation certificates; 
Handbook for management of public health 
events on board ships.
WHO
Ministry of Internal Affairs Migrations Migratory regulations N/A
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime / Port authority MARPOL annex V IMO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and 
issuance of ship sanitation certificates; Vector 
surveillance and control at ports, airports, and 
ground crossings.
WHO
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority MARPOL annex IV IMO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and 
issuance of ship sanitation certificates. WHO
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority BWMC IMO/GESAMP
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and 
issuance of ship sanitation certificates. WHO
Ministry of Defense/Trasnport Maritime/port authority Biofouling Guidelines -resolution MEPC.207(62 GEF/UNDP/IMO
Ministry of Health International Sanitary Authority
IHR; Handbook for inspection of ships and 










its related instruments. However, the lack of coordination between the competent authorities 
in all sectors remains.  
The Maritime sector needs the support not only of the Health sector but also of the 
Environmental sector, in order to assess the risks represented by a ship arriving at national 
ports. The arrival inspections conducted by the Harbor Master or the PSC supervisors should 
have a broader spectrum, but there are many gaps related to the lack of knowledge in other 
fields that could be covered by joint inspections or training. 
Chapter 4.3 Facing a Cholera outbreak with current Biosecurity regime, a 
practical example. 
If the cholera bacteria arrived today at the port of Chimbote, the most important fishing 
port in Peru, would the current biosecurity regime detect it in a timely manner? 
 Pre-Arrival: 
o The competent authorities verify the status of the ship's documentation 
on its way to the port, through the VUCE. 
o If the Ship´s Master does not give information concerning a sick person 
on board, there is no possibility of knowing about the bacteria. 
o It is impossible for the Ship´s Master to know that the ship is carrying 
the bacteria into the ballast water, biofouling or sewage. 
o The first barrier to avoid the introduction of the cholera bacteria should 
be IMARPE during its seawater and fish monitoring. However, IMARPE 
does not work a 24/7 regime, along the whole Peruvian coast. 
o If IMARPE detects bacteria, they should inform in accordance with its 
hierarchical line CONAM, then DIGESA. The latter should inform the 
HA, which will activate the national health protocols. 
o If IMARPE cannot detect it, then the responsibilities move to the next 
stage. 
o No possibility to take preventive measures. 
 Arrival: 
o To identify the source, a physical inspection should be carried out by 
the inspector conducting the reception of the ship (Harbor Master), after 
the free practice granted via VUCE by HA.  
o Then, if PSCO chooses the same ship, he will conduct another 
inspection on board. 
o For both MA representatives, it will be impossible to identify the arrival 
of the bacteria, because of the lack of knowledge in the medical field, 
and the lack of procedures related to ballast water, biofouling and 
sewage.  
o The MA inspector will then dispatch the ship without any incident. 
o No possibility to take control measures 
 Post-Arrival: 
o The ship departs, leaving the cholera bacteria in the Chimbote coast 
and in the City. 
o The spread of the disease starts though the food web (seafood) and 
contact with infected people. 
o The solution, as in the 1991 cholera outbreak, should be surveillance 
and protection in order to avoid the spread of the disease. 
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The difference with the 1991 outbreak is that the disease is now well-known. Therefore, 
the HA and the population will be able to deal effectively and efficiently with it. But what would 
happen if a new or unknown disease arrived in Peru? It would be the beginning of a new 
epidemic. 
Chapter 5 Analysis of the Peruvian biosecurity regime. 
The identification of the State entities related to the biosafety regime in Peru (See 
chapter 4.2), revealed a separation of objectives, functions, and responsibilities. Significant 
overlaps of roles and responsibilities have not been identified, but it has been possible to 
identify vulnerabilities and redundancy. 
Competent Authorities Objectives Vs. Vulnerabilities 
Each authority involved in biosecurity has a different objective. It may create gaps and 
the possibility of leaving a door open to biohazards. Two unfavorable conditions have been 
identified:  
 The lack of coordination and collaboration between the competent authorities 
in relation to biosecurity between environmental, health, and maritime sectors. 
Each administrative body has its own objectives and expect specific results. It 
seems that there is no willingness to create synergy with others. This deficiency 
is also noticeable even within sectors. For example, in the Maritime sector there 
are four competent authorities who hold some responsibilities related to 
biosecurity: MA, PA, HA, and SUNAT. Each of these authorities fulfills its 
functions on board and in port, but there is no exchange of information, 
particularly in areas beyond its own functions (blindness to other sectors). 
 The lack of physical inspections. It seems that the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
ratified by Peru (WTO, 2017) affects the amount of control which may disturb 
or slow down cargo flows. This agreement obliges states to use the Single 
Window, to reduce time, encourage trade and investment, to reduce 
bureaucratic barriers, especially at the borders. The result is that today, the 
only authority that goes onboard is the PSCO and private Sanitary companies 
because even the dispatches and receptions of ships are done virtually by 
using External Commerce Single Window called VUCE in Peru. 
Findings in the Environmental sector 
The most relevant findings regarding the biosecurity regime in this sector are two: 
 The environmental sector focus on LMOs and GMOs impacts on food security, 
the health of humans, animals, and plants, and the environment. Only in the 
article No. 102 of the General Environmental Law (Law No. 28611) mention 
that some measures must be taken against the introduction of invasive species. 
It is possible to notice that its objectives and functions are related more to 
biosafety. Even though, CONAM, as a focal point with SCBD, promote the 
enforcement of the CBD and Cartagena protocol into the national 
administration.  
 The use of concepts developed by international organizations may be 
inappropriate. Existing Peruvian environmental legislation misinterprets the 
concepts of "biosecurity" and "biosafety" (probably translation issue). A clear 
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example is the National Biosecurity Policy, which are actually procedures 
related to biosafety as defined by Cartagena Protocol. 
Regarding the second finding, FAO is obvious in mentioning problems related to the 
translation from English into Spanish and French: The English words "biosecurity" and 
"biosafety" generate a problem for translation into Spanish and French, because both have 
been translated as "biosecurity"; so, FAO said in its “Biosecurity Toolkit” that it is understood 
that the term biosecurity corresponds to “bioseguridad” and the term "biosafety" is translated 
as “bioinocuidad” in Spanish (FAO, 2007).  
Findings in the Health sector 
In relation to the biosecurity regime focused on the maritime field, the Health sector 
acts as a support entity for the maritime sector. However, as already mentioned in previous 
paragraphs there are no clear channels of coordination or harmonizing and integrating 
regulations to perform good teamwork between sectors and authorities.  
EDIH is the specialized health entity supporting the HA to accomplish IHR and its 
related instruments. 
On the other hand, when referring only to the health sector, its internal regulations are 
focused on the biosecurity and biosafety of medical facilities and their staff. 
Findings in the Maritime sector 
The first one is redundancy of procedures, mostly related to the protection of the 
environment, cargo, and garbage. Several authorities inspect the same way, but with different 
approaches. For example, in the protection of the environment, the HA verifies the final 
disposal of the garbage, as well as the existence of vectors that can affect the health of people, 
animals, and plants. While the MA verifies that the garbage management plan complies with 
international instruments mandates. 
The same happens with the cargo, SUNAT verifies the type of cargo, quantity, and 
destination to calculate the taxes that must be paid and to verify controlled products by law in 
the Peruvian state while the HA verifies the composition of the load in order to check if it is 
harmful to public health. The MA verifies that the corresponding segregation of dangerous 
goods complies with international instruments not affecting the security and safety of the ship 
or the crew. 
The second one is the absence of authorities onboard. The single window system -  
VUCE replaced physical inspection and visits onboard by virtual allowances. The supervisions 
made by PSCOs are random and do not affect 100% of ships. 
During the research, it was not possible to find a maritime Contingency Plan for 
Outbreaks emergencies. However, a Contingency Plan for disease outbreaks through Air 
economic borders already exists, perhaps it is easier to develop since there is only one 










 Peru has 20 logistics corridors and 2 structural axes that connect the 85 port 
facilities and the international airport with all other countries around America. These are 
roads with difficult surveillance and protection (post-arrival) of national territory, raise 
operating costs, and facilitate the spread of biohazards. 
Figure 17, Logistics corridor in Peruvian territory. Source: https://www.apn.gob.pe 
VUCE as a potential tool for biosecurity system 
The VUCE was created through Legislative Decree No. 165-2006, and its control was 
granted to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR) through the Foreign Trade 
Facilitation Law (Law No. 28977). 
 The VUCE is the unified system through which foreign trade operators will be able to 
manage, by using electronic means: certifications, permits, licenses and other authorizations 
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required by the competent authorities, for carrying out import and export operations of goods 









To fulfill their functions, all competent Authorities must have access to the system, in 
order to verify the information that by law corresponds to them. The software used by VUCE 




VUCE has all the necessary characteristics to be used as part of the biosecurity regime 
(see figure 20) because it involves all the competent authorities and serves as a platform for 
the exchange and storage of information. Although some changes are necessary to adapt to 



























Chapter 6 Conclusions and recommendations 
 Biosecurity is a broad topic which requieres the involvement of several state sectors 
in order to face biohazards properly. The appropriate way to successfully address this topic is 
by implementing a suitable “Biosecurity Policy” in accordance with every country´s needs. 
FAO promote a harmonized and integrated approach instead of a traditional approach, but 
each country has its own administrative, sociopolitical, geopolitical, economic, and 
environmental characteristics. 
 Despite the biosecurity approach used to develop a National Biosecurity Policy, it 
should observe special features, such well-defined objectives, competent authorities, 
jurisdiction, functions, and responsibilities, providing them with scientific infrastructure and a 
sufficient budget to perform their work. The entire country must be involved in the biosecurity 
regime. To achieve it, the coordination and collaboration between all sectors are needed 
(private and public) see figure 21. 
Figure 21, Sectors involved in a National Biosecurity regime. Source: FAO Biosecurity Toolkit 
The next step in the development of a Biosecurity Policy is to define the potential 
biohazards and their entry points. Economic borders (land, air and maritime) are by nature the 
doors for biohazards, and in the case of MEB, ports are potentially more vulnerable to them. 
In order to protect ports areas, a three-stage system must be implemented: during the 
“pre-arrival” of the ship (preventive measures), during the “arrival” (control measures), and 
during the “post-arrival” of the ship (surveillance and protection measures). 
The Shipping industry represents not only globalization of economies but also massive 
transportation for biohazards across the world. 
Peru is considered a mega-diverse country (WBO, 2013), with rich biodiversity that is 
the result of its wide-ranging geography which includes Andes mountain, the Amazon 
rainforest, and cold ocean. To protect this biodiversity, the population, and its economy, 
effective biosecurity policies must be developed. 
Currently, Peru faces a political, economic, and social scenario that favors and makes 




These aspects are:  
 The sustained growth of the economy related to international trade. 
 The strengthening of the democratic and institutional process. 
 The decentralization process 
 The growing expectation of citizens to exercise and realize their rights. 
 The growing culture for responsible health care. 
 The will and political support of the Government to make decisions within the 
framework of a public policy of social inclusion.  
This set of aspects should allow necessary changes to enhance policies related to 
biosecurity and effectively protect national interests through improved public service.  
The importance of the relationship between competent authorities in the biosecurity 
system is achievable as those entities share common goals related to the protection of people, 
animals, plants health, and the environment.  
Another problem identified during the investigation is related to the interpretation and 
translation of international instruments in order for it to be adequate for Peruvian legislation. 
For example, The NBP is, in reality, a National “Biosafety” Policy and this Policy does not 
include the Maritime sector in the risk assessment process. Consequently, the Environmental 
Authority remains out of the Maritime Biosecurity regime. 
In Peruvian legislation there are two good examples of regulations related to 
biosecurity, even though in the text of this document is never mentioned like that. One of them 
is the “Contingency Plan for airborne outbreaks,” which set the strategy to face a biological 
pathogen arriving by plane to the only international airport in Peru. The second one is the 
“Ebola Protocol” this regulation establishes timely and effective internal communication 
mechanisms in the case of suspected cases of Ebola Virus Disease in the country. 
To change the current Peruvian approach to a harmonized and integrated policy will 
require time and effort. Political will and allocation of resources would facilitate such necessary 
evolution. Completely integrated agency may not be possible, but a well-thought out 
coordination mechanism could enhance the current framework.  
Meanwhile, a national committee (figure 20), could consider a NBP without changing 
the traditional approach and by using the organizations, systems, and facilities that are already 
in place (see figure 22).  
The NBP should include: 
 National scope: 
o Objectives 
o Legal framework. 
o Competent Authorities. 
o Jurisdiction. 
o Responsibilities. 
o Support agencies. 
o Allocation of resources. 






 Sectorial scope: 
o Functions. 
o Procedures and protocols (Pre-arrival, Arrival & Post-arrival). 
o Penalties and sanctions. 
o Infrastructure. 
o Coordination channels. 
o Collaboration mechanism. 
o Contingency plans. 
Figure 22, Self‐elaboration, “National Biosecurity Policy template.” 
 The VUCE is a tool that could be used in Biosecurity Systems. It is already in place 
and integrates all competent authorities. Although, some changes are needed in VUCE 
platform, such as the inclusion of a biosecurity module inside the Port component with a risk 
assessment component, and including the Environmental Authority in the inspection process 
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Appendix 1: Rainbow trout case 
 One critical case related to invasive species is the arrival of rainbow trout. The first 
introduction of this non-native fish in Peru was made with 50,000 fertilized eggs from the 
United States that were taken to a hatchery in La Oroya, a region of Junín in 1925 (IMARPE, 
1979). The impact that this introduction caused was predation of a native fish (genus 
Astroblepus) in the Río Abiseo National Park, region of San Martín and moving them to other 
areas (Ortega et al., 2007). The same occurs in Titicaca Lake. Rainbow trout consumes all 
the fish named Orestias and Trichomycterus genera, invertebrates, and frogs (Cánepa et al., 
1998). While in Mala and Cañete rivers, region of Lima, it includes amphibians (Bufo and 
Telmatobius genera) in its diet and native fish (Basilichthys archaeus) (Palomino, 1984).  
The arrival of rainbow trout would have brought the introduction of the parasite 
“Ichthyophthirius multifilis,” which caused several epidemic events among the native fish of 


























































Appendix 6: National Environmental Policy 
General Objective: 
To improve people's quality of life, guaranteeing the existence of healthy, viable and 
functional ecosystems in the long term; and the sustainable development of the country, 
through the prevention, protection and recovery of the environment and its components, the 
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, in a responsible and consistent 
manner with respect for the fundamental rights of the person. 
Specific Objective: 
 Conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, in relation with:  
o Biodiversity. 
o LMOs and GMOs. 
o Biosecurity (misuse of the word should be biosafety). 
o To promote the rational and responsible use of natural resources. 
o Energy and mining. 
o Forests. 
o Marine ecosystems. 
o Basins, freshwater and soil. 
o Mitigation and adaptation to climate change. 
 Integral management of environmental quality. 
 Consolidation of the environmental governance 


















Appendix 7: CONAM legal framework 
Law N° 28245, Framework Law of the National System of Environmental Management 
assigns CONAM the responsibility of the planning, promoting, coordinating, regulating, 
sanctioning and supervising actions aimed at environmental protection.  
This Law promotes environmental research as well as integrate and strengthen 
relations with the competent entities of the public and private sector.  
Take some actions with the objective of giving scientific and technical support to the 
different organizations involved; give opinions on the draft legislation with environmental 
implications; as well as promoting the development and use of cleaner technologies, methods, 
practices and production, and marketing processes. 
 Law N° 28611, General Environmental Law regulates the National Environmental 
Authority functions, establishes provisions of transectoral scope on the management of the 
environment and its components, without prejudice to the specific roles carried out by the 
sectoral, regional authorities and competent premises.  
Likewise, it indicates that the State promotes the adoption of national technical norms, 
without generating unnecessary or unjustified obstacles to free trade, in accordance with 
current norms and international treaties ratified by the Peruvian State. 
Article 102 indicates that the species conservation policy implies the need to establish 
minimum conditions for their survival, population recovery and care, and assessments for the 




















Appendix 8: National Biosecurity Policy. 
The National Environmental Policy indicates the policy guidelines for biosecurity in 
section 3, which are: 
Establish mechanisms to regulate, under scientific parameters, any activity that 
involves the use of living modified organisms (LMOs) and genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs), as well as the safe and responsible use of modern biotechnology 
and its derived products. 
An adequate level of protection of human health, the environment, biological diversity, 
and its sustainable use must be guaranteed, in the area of generation, research, 
production, transfer, handling, transport, storage, conservation, exchange, marketing, 
use confined and released to the environment, from GMOs and their derivative 
products. 
Identify the applications of modern biotechnology and evaluate its relevance and 
opportunity in solving specific problems in national production processes or in the 
generation of services, in a safe, competitive, and sustainable way. 
Promote the responsible use of modern biotechnology without damaging productive 
processes that are already competitive and sustainable, and whose goods and 
products are appropriate and appropriate. 
Build and develop a regulatory system based on the application of transparent and 
scientific risk analysis; capable of guaranteeing the safety and traceability of the goods 
and / or services obtained through the application of modern biotechnology, 
responding to the demands of consumers, to our condition as a mega-diverse country 
and to the context of continuous technological developments. 
Establish scientific, environmental, socio-economic and political criteria for a 
biosecurity system and responsible use of biotechnology, with levels of security 
compatible with the national / foreign trade policy and promotion of local and national 
innovation. 
Generate, use, and disseminate quality information on biosecurity, to contribute to 
responsible decision-making between suppliers and users and for the construction of 
a properly informed public opinion. 
Generate and strengthen the scientific and technological management and 
infrastructure capacities of the institutions whose scope of action is the regulation of modern 
biotechnology, necessary for the implementation of national and international biosecurity 
legal frameworks. 
The development of the NBP was carried out by the Ministry of Environment, INIEA, 
Vive-Ministry of Fisheries, and DIGESA. The maritime sector was not taken into 
consideration generating gaps between these sectors. Procedures related to ballast water, 
biofouling and sewage is only concern of the MA for now. 
